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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States currently has the largest percentage of foreign-
born residents within its borders since World War H. 1 This exponential
population growth began to be reflected in the workplace during the
course of the past few years. 2 This influx, however, came at a time when
many Americans were unemployed, underemployed, or barely getting by.
Although the unemployment rate has gone down recently and the econ-
omy is looking up, Americans continue to see themselves, family, and
friends squeezed out of the marketplace. Consequently, those same
Americans felt and continue to feel that foreigners are to blame. Inevita-
bly, immigrants have become labeled as pariahs responsible for stealing
American jobs and causing American families pain. Thus today, govern-
ments and courts are forced to deal with the aftermath of constituent, co-
alition, and legislative-based attacks on foreigners through anti-
immigration legislation. 3
English-only laws are one such form of anti-immigrant legislation.
English-only rules make English the official language of a state and, in
the most extreme situations, require government employees to act only in
English during the performance of government business. In 1988, Ai-
1. See ROBERT FAMIGHETrI, WORLD ALMANAC 377 (1997). As of April 1, 1996, the
Census Bureau reported that there are 264.6 million people in the United States. Of the
reported 23 million foreign born residents: 6.7 million immigrants were from Mexico; 1.2
million from the Phillippines; 797,000 were Cuban; 650,000 were from El Salvador;
617,000 were from Great Britain; 509,000 were from the Dominican Republic; 538,000
were Polish; 531,000 were Jamaican; and 816,000 were from China/Taiwan/Hong Kong.
2. This exponential population growth has begun to be reflected in the workplace. In
fact, recent studies show that between 1980 and 1987, Hispanic workers accounted for al-
most a fifth of employment growth in the United States. This extreme increase is antici-
pated to continue; most projections indicate that by the year 2000, as much as ten percent
of the nation's labor force will be Hispanic. See Mark Adams, Fear of Foreigners: Nativ-
ism and Workplace Language Restrictions, 74 OR. L. REv. 849, 849 (1995).
3. Id. The workplace has emerged as the primary battleground of the official English
movement and the civil rights of language minorities. Id. In an effort to curb the use of
foreign language in the workplace many employers have established English-only rules
whereby employees are required to refrain from speaking languages other than English on
the employer's premises. See Constitutional Law--First Amendment-Ninth Circuit Invali-
dates Arizona Constitution's Official English Requirement, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1827
(1996). See also America Needs No Language Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1995 at A14.
See also generally Emily Sanford, State Flag, Seal, and other Symbols: Designate En-
glish as the Official Language of the State of Georgia, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 320 (1996).
For example, in 1986 California voters adopted an amendment to their state constitution
declaring English the State's official language; and Florida did just the same two years
later. See Carol Schmid, Language Rights and the Legal Status of English-Only Laws in
the Public and Private Sector, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 65 (1992).
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zona adopted the latter alternative by amending its state constitution. This
severe measure was met with a great deal of opposition and spawned a
tremendous amount of litigation. This Comment analyzes one piece of
litigation in particular, Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English.4 The
premise of this Comment is that English-only statutes precluding individ-
uals from communicating in languages other than English during the per-
formance of their government jobs are unconstitutional.
This Comment is organized as follows. Part II is an analysis of
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English. The analysis begins by explor-
ing the constitutionality of Article XXVIII of the Arizona Constitution.
The constitutionality of the amendment is evaluated against federal civil
rights law, specifically Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as
the historical origins of the First Amendment. Article XXVIII is then ex-
amined according to the traditional principles of public employee speech.
The principles of employee speech include matters of personal concern,
matters of public concern, and the Pickering Test.
Part m of the Comment looks at the fate of future English-only stat-
utes. The fate of such statutes possibly rests on the interpretation of Arti-
cle XXVm in Ruiz v. Symington.5 The constitutionality of English-only
statutes will inevitably be decided, even if Ruiz fails to settle the contro-
versy, as there are numerous such cases at courts' doors. Following the
examination of Ruiz, this Comment scrutinizes the U.S. Supreme Court's
stance on exclusivist legislation. To illustrate, in 1996 the Court held un-
constitutional an amendment to Colorado's constitution which singled out
and precluded gays from seeking the basic protections of local govern-
ment. It is from this holding that legal scholars can analogize the Colo-
rado constitutional amendment to that of Arizona, and thus surmise that
Article XXVIII is unconstitutional as well.
Part IV concludes that the Court missed a valuable opportunity to
decide the constitutionality of English-only statutes when it held that it
need not address the issue as the claim was now moot. In essence, free
speech lost the day because the Court declined to tackle the issue. In the
end, however, free speech must win the war in light of jurisprudential
precedent and recent U.S. Supreme Court trends as related to legislation
which denies specific classes of people the protections of government.
4. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990); Yniguez v. Arizonans for
Official English, 42 3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1995); Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,
69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055
(1997).
5. 1996 WL 309512 (Ariz. App., June 11, 1996).
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II. YNIGUEZ V. ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGuSH
A. Background
In October 1987, Arizonans for Official English (AOE) initiated a
drive to amend Arizona's constitution.6 AOE promotes the English-Only
Movement. AOE is headed by Robert Park, a retired criminal investiga-
tor for the Immigration and Naturalization Service.7 The AOE sponsored
a ballot initiative that eventually became Article XXVIII of Arizona's
state constitution. Article XXVIII in part reads:
English is the official language of the State of Arizona
[T]his Article applies to: the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of government, all political subdivisions, departments,
agencies, organizations, and instrumentalities of this State, includ-
ing local governments and municipalities, all government officials
and employees during the performance of government business
• . . This State and all political subdivisions of this State shall
act in English and no other language .... 8
AOE succeeded in placing its proposed constitutional amendment on the
November 1988 ballot.9 The ballot passed with only 50.5% of voting
Arizonans casting ballots in favor of the law.'0
When Article XXVII was passed, Maria-Kelley Yniguez, a Latina,
was working for the Arizona Department of Administration as a medical
malpractice claims adjustor." She was bilingual-fluent and literate in
both English and Spanish.' 2 Before Article XXVII's passage, she com-
municated to monolingual Spanish-speaking claimants in Spanish, and in
a combination of English and Spanish with bilingual claimants.' 3 Follow-
ing the passage of the state constitutional amendment, state employees
who failed to obey the Arizona Constitution became subject to sanctions.
For this reason,- immediately following the passage of Article XXVIII
Yniguez stopped speaking Spanish on the job in fear of being administra-
6. See Martina Stewart, English Only Laws, Informational Interests and the Mean-
ing of the First Amendment in Pluralistic Society, 31 HARV.C.R.- CL. L. REv. 539, 541
(1996).
7. Id.
8. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 949 (9th Cir. 1995).
9. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 541.
10. Id.
11. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 949.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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tively disciplined. 14 Then in November 1988, Yniguez filed an action in
federal district court against the State of Arizona, Governor Mofford, Ar-
izona Attorney General Robert Corbin, and Director of the Arizona De-
partment of Administration Catherine Eden. 5 She sought injunctive re-
lief, counsel fees, and "all other relief that the court deems just and
proper under the circumstances."' 6
Yniguez's complaint was later amended to include Jaime Gutierrez,
a Hispanic state senator from Arizona, as a plaintiff. Gutierrez declared
that prior to the passage of Article XXVIII he spoke Spanish when
speaking with his Spanish-speaking constituents and that he continued to
do so after the Article's passage. He claimed, however, that he was
afraid that doing so made him liable for suit pursuant to Article
XXVI. 7
The defendants moved for dismissal and the Attorney General issued
an opinion regarding Article XXVIII which explained that to avoid con-
flicts with the U.S. Constitution, the Article included only "the official"
acts of the Arizona government.'8 The federal district court decided that
"either the Eleventh Amendment or Article III's case-or-controversy re-
quirement, U.S. CONST. art. M, §2, paragraph 1, shielded the other de-
fendants from suit."' 9 Governor Mofford, however, was not shielded be-
cause Mofford was the only one capable of enforcing the Article against
Yniguez, and the only official who threatened to enforce the provision
against state employees. 20 The court granted declaratory relief against
Mofford, but denied Yniguez's claim for injunctive relief because Mof-
ford did not specifically threaten enforcement of Article XXVIII against
Yniguez.2' Mofford did not appeal.
The federal district court then reached the merits of the case. It read
Article XXVII as barring state officers and employees from using any
language other than English in performing their official duties, except to
the extent that certain exceptions in the provision are applied. 22 The dis-
trict court found that Article XXVHI infringed on constitutionally pro-
tected speech and the provision was facially overbroad in violation of the
14. Id.
15. Id. at 925.
16. Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 1997 WL 84990, at *4.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997).
20. Yniguez, 69 F. 3d at 925.
21. Id.
22. Arizonans For Official English, 117 S. Ct. at 1057.
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First Amendment.23 Because the court found that the Article violated the
First Amendment, the court decided it need not reach the other constitu-
tional and statutory grounds that Yniguez asserted.24
When AOE learned that the State had decided not to appeal the de-
cision, it moved to intervene post-judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24(a), for the purpose of pursing an appeal of the federal
district court's order.25 Then the Attorney General moved to intervene be-
cause the court rejected its interpretation of Article XXVIII and refused
to certify to state court the question of Article XXVIII's proper interpre-
tation. The district court denied AOE as well as the Attorney General the
right to intervene.26 It also denied the request to have the state court de-
termine Article XXVIII's proper interpretation. 27
The case then was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals reversed the judgements to
AOE and permitted it to intervene as a party to the appeal. 28 The Ninth
Circuit said that AOE's role as the principal sponsor of the ballot initia-
tive meant that it had a strong interest in upholding the Article, espe-
cially since the State, through Governor Mofford, failed to defend the
law.29 The Ninth Circuit also permitted the Arizona Attorney General to
intervene not as a party, but only to defend the constitutionality of Arti-
23. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1995).
24. Id. at 926.
25. Id.
26. Id. See Yniguez v. Mofford, 130 F.R.D. 410 (1990). The district court denied the
Attorney General the ability to intervene under 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) because that statute
authorizes intervention by a state attorney general only in actions to which the State or
any agency, officer or employee is not a party. Id. at 412. In the instant case, the Gover-
nor was still a party defendant, and the attorney general as well as Department of Admin-
istration Director Eden were formerly party defendants. Id. Moreover, the attorney general
was already permitted to argue the constitutionality of Article XXVIII. Id.
The district court also denied AOE the right to intervene. First, AOE failed to com-
ply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c)'s requirement that its motion to intervene
be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim for which intervention is sought. Id.
at 413. Second, the Committee as an unincorporated association without capacity to sue
or be sued did not have legal capacity to intervene. Id. at 413-14. Third, the Committee
lacked the ability to establish that any of its members would have the standing necessary
to have an appealable interest in this action. Id. at 415.
27. Id. at 412. Given the district court's decision that Article XXVIII was not sus-
ceptible to a construction that would eliminate its unconstitutional overbreadth, any certi-
fication of a narrowing construction would be improper. To narrow its scope would be as
inappropriate as asking a state court to rewrite a statute.
28. Id.
29. Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, No. 3 PREVIEw U.S. Sup. CT. CAS.,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 135.
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cle XXVIII and only as long as AOE maintained an appeal.30
Arizona's Attorney General then argued that Yniguez's departure
from her job as a state employee made her claims moot.3' Yniguez, a
state employee at the time when she filed her complaint, however, volun-
tarily left the State to get a job in the private sector in 1990.32 But the
Ninth Circuit ruled that Yniguez's claim was not moot because she was
still appealing the federal district court's refusal to award her nominal
damages. 33 In a subsequent decision, a three-judge panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's ruling
that the Article infringed on the First Amendment.3 4 The Ninth Circuit
then vacated that ruling and decided to hear the matter en banc. The en
banc Ninth Circuit in a six-to-five vote affirmed the federal district
court's finding that Article XXVIII violated the First Amendment.35
The en banc Ninth Circuit majority opinion agreed that Article
XXVIII was facially overbroad. 36 The majority stated that the Article pre-
vented state legislators and other government officials from being able to
speak on political matters with their non-English-speaking constituents. 37
These constituents were prevented from receiving valuable information
about government services. The court also reasoned that Article XXVIII
was so broad that it extended to Arizona's public universities, which
under the provision would be prevented from issuing diplomas in Latin.38
It also would bar Arizona judges who perform weddings from saying
"mazel toy."' 39
In addition, the Ninth Circuit also repudiated the Arizona Attorney
General's recommendation that Article XXVIII be given a narrower inter-
pretation so that it would not restrict constitutionally protected speech to
such a great degree 0 The court felt that a narrow interpretation would
clash with the plain meaning of the provision.4'
The Ninth Circuit rejected the following First Amendment argu-
ments from AOE as well: 1) that Article XXVIII only infringed on un-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 1997 WL 84990, at *4.
33. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1995).
34. Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, No. 3 PREvimw U.S. Sup. CT. CAS.,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 135.
35. Id.
36. Arizonans For Official English, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1067 (1997).
37. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 931.
38. Id. at 932.
39. Id.
40. Arizonans For Official English, 117 S. Ct. at 1067.
41. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 930.
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protected modes of speech; 2) that Yniguez's speech while performing
her job could be substantially regulated because she was functioning as a
government employee; and 3) that the benefits to Arizonans from Article
XXVIII (i.e. governmental efficiency) were strong enough to support its
constitutionality.42 Finally, the court awarded Yniguez nominal damages
because it held that her constitutional rights were violated.43
The Ninth Circuit's decision then went before the U.S. Supreme
Court which granted the petition for a writ of certiorari. The Court in a
unanimous opinion held that Ms. Yniguez, who filed her claim as an in-
dividual and not a class representative, had a viable claim at the outset of
the suit.44 But the Court noted that her claim then became moot with her
voluntary departure for a position in the private sector. Therefore, the
case lost the essential elements of a justifiable controversy and should
not have been retained for adjudication on the merits by the court of ap-
peals.45 To qualify as a case fit for federal court adjudication, an actual
controversy must exist at all stages of review, not solely at the time the
complaint is filed."
Thus, the Court was compelled to vacate the Ninth Circuit judg-
ment, and remand the case to the court of appeals with the instructions
that the action be dismissed by the district court. 47 Consequently, the
Court never reached the substantive issues of the case: whether the inter-
pretation of Article XXVEII was correct and whether the measure was
constitutional."
In addition, the Court stated that it did not have to definitively re-
solve the issue of whether AOE or its chairman, Robert Park, had stand-
ing to defend the constitutionality of Article XXVIm.49 But the Court did
announce that state legislators had standing to oppose a decision holding
a state statute unconstitutional if state law authorizes legislators to repre-
sent the State's interests.5 0 In other words, because legislators are elected
representatives of the people, as public officials, they can defend initia-
tives which become the law of the state. Although AOE and its members
were initiative sponsors they were not elected officials. Consequently, the
42. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, No. 3 PREVIEW U.S. SUp. CT. CAS.,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 136.
43. Id.
44. Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 1997 WL 84990, at *13.
45. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
46. Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 1997 WL 84990, at *2. See also
Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975).
47. Arizonans For Official English, 1997 WL 84990, at *2.
48. Id.
49. Id. at *13.
50. Id. See also Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987).
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Court held that because Arizona had not enacted a state law which ap-
pointed initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend
in lieu of public officials, AOE and Park did not have constitutional
standing to enter the suit. 51
Also, AOE asserted representational or associational standing. An
association has standing to sue or defend only if its members would have
standing in their own right.52 Moreover, the requisite concrete injury to
AOE members was not apparent. 53 As nonparties in the federal district
court, AOE members were not bound by the judgement for Yniguez.
Thus, the Court had great doubts as to whether AOE and Park had stand-
ing under Article Ill to pursue appellate review. 54
B. Case Analysis
The Court elected not to entertain the case on jurisprudential
grounds. The Court held that Ms. Yniguez's claim was moot because she
no longer worked for the State of Arizona.55 Some might argue that the
Court was trying to avoid tackling the volatile constitutionality issues la-
tent in English-only laws. Others might propose that the basic notions of
federalism fueled the Court's decision. In essence, the Court attempted to
say that it was more appropriate for a state's high court to declare a state
statute unconstitutional rather than for a federal court to so hold. How-
ever, a more likely explanation is that the Court was waiting for the right
case. In other words, the Court was less interested in the role of a state's
high court and was more concerned about granting certiorari to a case
with issues of questionable mootness. The Court wanted to address the
constitutional issues latent in English-only laws, but not at the expense of
challenges from the legal community declaring that the Court had no
business entertaining a moot case. The Court probably anticipated that
the losing party in Ruiz v. Symington,56 a Ninth Circuit case with the
same constitutional issues, would likely petition the Court for certiorari.
The Court could address the constitutional issues in Ruiz without fear of
backlash from the legal community because the claim is still viable as all
plaintiffs still work for the State of Arizona. Moreover, because the Court
granted certiorari in Yniguez there is a strong possibility that it will do
the same in Ruiz. One could logically assume that when the Court
51. Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 1997 WL 84990, at *13.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at *14.
56. Ruiz v. Symington, 1996 WL 309512 (Ariz. App. Div.1) (1996).
1998]-
126 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
granted certiorari in Yniguez, it was sending a message that the constitu-
tional issues in Yniguez were worthy of clarification.
The decision, in a narrow sense, precludes the State of Arizona and
its citizens from learning the answers to the substantive issues of the
Yniguez case, which were as follows: 1) the constitutionality of Article
XXVIII of the Arizona State Constitution and, more specifically, whether
the plaintiffs' First Amendment freedoms were trampled; and 2) the legal
meaning of Article XXVII. In a much broader sense, the country as a
whole is left to guess at whether statutes forbidding the performance of
government acts in languages other than English infringe on state and
federal employees' First Amendment freedoms. If the Court rules that
federal and state English-only statutes precluding government employees
from "acting in languages other than English during performance of their
official duties" are unconstitutional, then English-only statutes must be
overturned.
Ruiz v. Symington involved ten plaintiffs that brought an action in
superior court against the Governor and Attorney General of Arizona.
57
All plaintiffs were bilingual and regularly communicated in Spanish and
English as private citizens and during the performance of government
business. 58 They sought a declaratory judgment that Article XXVIII vio-
lated the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.59 The plaintiffs included four state elected officials, five
state employees, and one private citizen. The defendants included Fife
Symington, Governor of Arizona, the Arizona State Attorney General,
AOE and its chairman, Robert Park.6°
Most importantly, Ruiz will provide the courts an opportunity to
tackle English-only laws, in particular, Article XXVIII of Arizona's con-
stitution. In light of the fact that the constitutionality of Article XXVIII
will inevitably undergo judicial scrutiny, it is appropriate to now turn to
an in-depth examination of this issue.
1. Constitutionality of Article XXVIII
Article XXVIII raises serious questions about the authority of the
government to restrict the free speech of its employees. One line of U.S.
Supreme Court cases has vehemently affirmed the free speech rights of
government employees, speaking on matters of public importance, 61 while
57. Id. at *1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Pickering v. Board of Educ. Of Township High School District, 391 U.S.
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another line has given the government tremendous discretion to restrict
public employee speech, particularly personal speech.62 So which line of
cases is the proper one to follow? The answer is a complicated one be-
cause Yniguez's use of Spanish does not fit the classic definition of con-
stitutionally protected speech on matters of public importance; yet, her
use of Spanish does not seem like personal speech on the job which the
government has wide latitude to regulate.63
As this Comment will demonstrate, it is clear that Ms. Yniguez's
speech should be protected. The first step in defending this thesis is an
examination of the federal civil rights law. Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act is a logical beginning for this analysis because its focus is
discrimination in the workplace.
a. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act&
1.) The Purpose of Title VII
Title VII outlaws employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.6 "Title VII makes it unlawful to refuse
to hire, discharge, or 'otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment.' "66 Moreover, employers are prohibited from limiting, segre-
gating, or classifying employees or job applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any person of job opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee on the basis
of prohibited criteria.67
While Title VII does not expressly forbid discrimination on the basis
of language, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
has promulgated broad guidelines defining national origin discrimina-
tion.6s These regulations include discrimination based on an " 'individ-
ual's or his ancestor's place of origin,' or because an 'individual has the
563 (1968); United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003
(1995).
62. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
63. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, No. 3 PREvmw U.S. SuP. CT. CAS.,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 136.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1994).
65. Id.
66. See Schmid, supra note 3, at 76 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)(1) (1981 &
Supp. 1990)).
67. Id.
68. Id. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29
C.F.R. § 1606.1-.7 (1997).
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physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin
group.' "69 The EEOC Guidelines specifically assert that an individual's
mother tongue or primary language is an important aspect of national ori-
gin.70 Moreover, by the end of the Carter administration, the EEOC ren-
dered its "Speak-English-Only Guidelines," which state that an English-
only rule may be an encumbrance on the terms and conditions of em-
ployment.71 Moreover, Section 1606.7 of the Guidelines on National Dis-
crimination Because of National Origin provides as follows:
Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from speak-
ing their primary language or the language they speak most com-
fortably, disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities
on the basis of national origin. It may also create an atmosphere
of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation based on national origin
which could result in a discriminatory working environment.
Therefore, the Commission will presume that such a rule violates
Title VII and will closely scrutinize it.72
It must also be noted that the EEOC, however, does presume that En-
glish-only rules applied only at certain times are permissible when justi-
fied by business necessity.7 3
2.) Cases involving itle VII
The major cases addressing English-only laws in the private work-
place, Garcia v. Gloor,74 Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.75, and Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co.,76 set the stage for Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official En-
glish.77 They are some of the first cases attacking limitations on work-
69. Schmid, supra note 3, at 76. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1-.7 (1997).
70. See Schmid, supra note 3, at 82-83.
71. See Dan Clawson, Garcia v. Spun Steak Co. The Ninth Circuit Requires that Ti-
tle VII Plaintiffs Prove the Adverse Effect of a Challenged English-Only Workplace Rule,
17 U. PUGET SouND L. REV. 473, 480 (1994).
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1-.7 (1990).
73. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7.
74. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
75. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
76. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
2726 (1994).
77. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990); Yniguez v. Arizonans for
Official English, 42 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1995); Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,
69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055
(1997).
[Vol. 22
YNIGUEZ V. ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH
place communications in languages other than English. These cases use
Title VII (National Origin Discrimination) as the preferred weapon for at-
tacking English-only rules.
Although the holdings of Jurado, Gloor, and Spun Steak do not di-
rectly support the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the argument, in Yniguez,
that English-only laws are a proxy for national origin discrimination),7 8
they are useful in understanding the historical background of case law
challenging English-only rules in the workplace. The pre-Yniguez cases
provide prospective plaintiffs the opportunity to see the mistakes of pre-
vious litigants in English-only cases. Thus, Ms. Yniguez and future plain-
tiffs learn from the following cases that a case must be grounded in a
theory other than Title VII, such as a First Amendment violation, to
succeed.
a.) Garcia v. Gloor
In Garcia v. Gloor, the plaintiff was a Hispanic, capable of speaking
English and Spanish, who contested his workplace rule which prohibited
employees from speaking Spanish on the job unless they were communi-
cating with Spanish-speaking customers.79 The court held that the En-
glish-only rule in Gloor did not forbid cultural expression to persons for
whom compliance with it might impose hardship.80 While Title VII pro-
hibits the imposition of burdensome terms and conditions of employment
as well as those that create an atmosphere heavy with racial and ethnic
oppression, the evidence did not support a finding that the rule had this
effect on the plaintiff.8 '
The Act does not support an interpretation that equates the lan-
guage an employee prefers to use with his national origin. To a
person who speaks only one tongue or to a person who has diffi-
culty using another language than the one spoken in his home,
language might well be an immutable characteristic like skin
color, sex or place of birth. However, the language a person who
is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular time is by defini-
tion a matter of choice.
8 2
78. See Mark Adams, Fear of Foreigners: Nativism and Workplace Language Re-
strictions, 74 OR. L. REv. 849, 885, 891-92 (1995).
79. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
80. Id. at 270.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Thus, it can be argued that Ms. Yniguez, like Mr. Garcia who is bi-
lingual, is not injured by an English-only law because her decision to
speak in a particular language is merely a matter of choice. That this rule
prevents some employees like Garcia and Yniguez from exercising a
preference to speak in Spanish does not convert it into discrimination
based on national origin.83
b.) Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.
Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.84 is another example of a case which
fails under a Title VII theory. As the following discussion reveals Jurado
is a text book illustration of what a plaintiff should not argue when at-
tacking English-only work place laws.
The Ninth Circuit in Jurado followed the earlier Gloor decision.85 In
Jurado, a bilingual disc jockey performing on California radio station
KIIS as Val Valentine was fired when he refused to follow an English-
only format on the air. Jurado on numerous occasions spoke Spanish on
his program at the request of his employer's program director, but was
told to stop after a drop in ratings thought to be a result of confusion
caused by the bilingual format.87 Jurado then brought a Title VII action
against KIIS alleging disparate impact and disparate treatment.88
To prevail on a disparate treatment theory, Jurado had to prove that
KIIS intended to discriminate against him in his dismissal.89 To establish
a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the employee must offer evi-
dence that indicates an influence of unlawful discrimination.9° Jurado's
prima facie disparate treatment case failed because there was insufficient
evidence that KIlS discharged him for discriminatory motives. 9'
A disparate impact case involves a facially neutral employment
practice that disproportionally disadvantages one group against another.92
To establish a prima facie case, the employee must identify an employ-
ment practice which significantly injures a protected group, but need not
show that the employer aimed to discriminate. 93 The district court found
83. Id.
84. 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
85. Id.
86. See Clawson, supra note 71, at 484.
87. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1409.
88. Id. at 1408-12.
89. Id. at 1409.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
[Vol. 22
YNIGUEZ V. ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH
Jurado's only basis for a disparate impact claim was that the English-
only order somehow disproportionally hurt Hispanics.94 The court found
this theory meritless because Jurado was bilingual and could easily com-
ply with the order.95 The United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California granted summary judgement for KIIS on both allega-
tions, and Jurado appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.96
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment decision against
Jurado. 97 The court refused to accept Jurado's allegation that the pro-
gramming decision emanated from racial animus.98 The mere fact that a
station adopts a format to attract a target audience does not tend to show
racial animus in employment.99 Moreover, the English-only order itself
was not discriminatory against a bilingual person such as Jurado. 1°° Em-
ployers can properly enforce a limited, reasonable, and business-related
English-only rule against an employee who can readily comply with the
rule and who voluntarily chooses not to observe it as a result of individ-
ual preference. 10
c.) Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.
In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,l°2 the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected
the presumption that English-only rules are per se discriminatory. 0 3 The
court instead espoused a standard requiring proof of adverse impact for
English-only rules as well as for other allegedly discriminatory
practices.1°4
The defendant, Spun Steak Co., produced meat products in Califor-
nia. At the time of the action, its workforce consisted mostly of bilingual
Hispanics as well as two employees who spoke only Spanish. 0 5 After re-
ceiving numerous complaints that two bilingual Hispanics were con-
stantly harassing African American and Chinese workers with derogatory
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1409.
97. Id. at 1408.
98. Id. at 1410.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2726 (1994).
103. Id. at 1487 n.1.
104. See Clawson, supra note 71, at 487.
105. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483.
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and racist comments, Spun Steak passed an English-only rule in the at-
tempt of achieving racial harmony.1°6 In response to the rule, the employ-
ees brought suit.
The employees first argued that the English-only rule denied them
the ability to speak Spanish on the job and had a discriminatory impact
on them because it imposed a burdensome term or condition of employ-
ment exclusively upon Hispanic workers. It denied them a privilege of
employment that non-Spanish speaking workers enjoy - the ability to
converse on the job in a language they feel most comfortable. They next
argued that the English-only rule denied them the ability to culturally ex-
press themselves. Lastly, they argued the policy created an atmosphere of
inferiority."°7 The court stated, however, that despite the plaintiffs asser-
tions, Title VII did not protect their ability to express their cultural heri-
tage in the workplace."'8
The court also stated that the ability to converse, especially to make
small-talk, was a privilege of employment. 1 9 The employees in Spun
Steak attempted to define the privilege as the ability to speak in the lan-
guage of their choice. The court rejected the employees' notion and
stated that privileges are given at the employer's discretion and the em-
ployer has the right to define its contours." 0 In Spun Steak, the employer
defined the privilege narrowly.' The employer allowed employees to
speak in the language of their choice only during lunch, breaks, and the
employee's own time." 2 Because the privilege was defined at its narrow-
est, as merely the ability to speak on the job, the court refused to con-
clude that those employees fluent in both Spanish and English were ad-
versely affected by the policy." 3
Moreover, the Spun Steak court concluded that Title VII was not in-
tended to apply against rules that merely inconvenience employees, even
if the inconvenience falls consistently on a protected class." 4 Rather, Ti-
tle VII protects against only those policies that have a tremendous im-
pact; the fact that an employee may have to catch himself or herself from
106. Id. The restrictions in Spun Steak read as follows: "[1]t is hereafter the policy
of this Company that only English will be spoken in connection with work." This rule is
little different than Arizona's Article XXVIII which requires all employees to act only in
English.
107. Id at 1485-88.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1488.
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periodically slipping into Spanish does not inflict a burden great enough
to amount to the denial of equal opportunity. 1 5
The above discussion provided a context for English-only statutes.
Historically, plaintiffs have attempted, but to no avail, to overturn En-
glish-only statutes under a Title VII theory. Consequently, courts, in es-
sence, have forced plaintiffs to pursue other theories in their efforts to
defeat them. A First Amendment analysis is a potential viable theory
upon which a plaintiff can proceed. Accordingly, a detailed look at the
First Amendment follows.
2. Historical Background of the First Amendment
When evaluating issues arising under the United States Constitution,
it is often helpful to first look at the original intent of the Framers who
drafted the Constitution. It would be a mistake to analyze the First
Amendment in total disregard of the forefathers' intent. If one evaluates
the First Amendment from only the point of view of a Twenty-First-
Century man, one risks distorting the meaning of the Amendment's lan-
guage. Thomas Jefferson in a letter to William Johnson wrote that on
every question of construction, we should carry ourselves back to the
time when the Constitution was ratified; recollect the spirit manifested in
the debates; and instead of trying to find what meaning may be squeezed
out of the text, or invented against it, conform to the probable one in
which it was passed." 6 For these reasons, it is necessary to lay out the
historical background on the First Amendment. More importantly, glanc-
ing at the intent of the Constitution's framers leads to the conclusion that
English-only laws are in direct opposition to the underpinnings of the
United States Constitution. This historical perspective provides Ms.
Yniguez with more ammunition for her First Amendment claim.
The colonists brought many languages and cultures to a fledgling
America which was already initially populated by Native Americans who
themselves had more than 200 languages and dialects." 7 Although En-
glish has been the de facto primary language in the United States, the
Constitution never mentions it as the official language of the nation." 8
The Yniguez case deals with two forms of communication which are be-
ing restricted; first, communications in languages other than English be-
tween employees and the public (the Jurado scenario); and second, com-
115. Id.
116. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1530 (1995).
117. See Adams, supra note 2, at 852.
118. Id. See also Antonio Califa, Declaring English the Official Language:
Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 293, 303 (1989).
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munications between employees in languages other than English (the
Gloor scenario). In Yniguez, the court invalidated Article XXVIII of Ari-
zona's Constitution enforcing an English-only rule barring an employee's
use of foreign language with the public. 119 Moreover, Article XXVIII not
only limits communications between employees and the public, it stran-
gles the ability of employees to communicate amongst themselves in the
language of their choice. 20
Perhaps because of this nation's great tradition of linguistic diver-
sity, the Constitution fails to mention an official language.'2' The Framers
specifically refused to give special recognition to English due to the con-
nection between language and liberty.'2 In fact, the Continental Congress
issued official publications, including the Articles of Confederation, in
French, German, and English during the Revolutionary War era.'2
In a debate in the House of Representatives, James Madison re-
marked that if we avert to the true nature of Republican government, we
shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the Government,
and not in the Government over the people. 24 His premise was that the
Constitution created a form of government under which the people, not
the government, possess the absolute sovereignty. Thus, the right of free
discussion was and is a fundamental principle of the American form of
government.' 25 The First Amendment as a constitutional safeguard for
freedom of expression was fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange
of ideas.'2
Maintaining the opportunity for free political discussion so that gov-
ernment is responsive to the will of the people and changes in policy
may be achieved by lawful means, is a fundamental principal of our Re-
public. 27 It is a treasured American privilege to speak one's mind, al-
119. Id.
120. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981); Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2726 (1994). Gloor and Spun Steak sustained this notion.
121. See Adams, supra note 2, at 852.
122. Id. See also Juan Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American
Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 274
(1992); SHIRLEY BRIcE HEATH, LANGUAGE AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES IN LIN-
GUISTICS AND ANRmoPOLOGY 267, 270 (Muriel Saville-Troike ed., 1977); David Marshall,
The Question of an Official Language: Language Rights and the English Language
Amendment, 60 INT'L J. Soc. LANG. 7, 10-11 (1986).
123. See Adams, supra note 2, at 852.
124. See N.Y. Times v. L.B. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 268.
127. Id. See also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
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though not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. 28
This opportunity should be afforded vigorous advocacy no less than ab-
stract discussion. 29 In addition, Judge Learned Hand declared that the
First Amendment presupposes that correct conclusions are more likely to
be "gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of au-
thoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we
have staked upon it our all."'' 30
In looking at the origins of the First Amendment, it is clear that this
Nation's forefathers intended to foster unfettered speech in any language.
Ms. Yniguez's argument gains strength from the original intent of the
forefathers in their creation of the United States Constitution. Not only
does Ms. Yniguez's argument succeed under the original intent of the
forefathers, it also succeeds under the overbreadth doctrine. The next sec-
tion discusses the overbreadth doctrine, a doctrine which allows people to
challenge a statute on its face because it threatens third parties not before
the court. This doctrine is crucial to the Yniguez case because Article
XXVIII of Arizona's Constitution is overbroad. In proving that Article
XXVII is overbroad, Ms. Yniguez as well as future plaintiffs gain addi-
tional ammunition to succeed in convincing the court to declare the
amendment unconstitutional.
3. Unconstitutionality of Article XXVIII
a. General Principles of Overbreadth Doctrine
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine allows people to chal-
lenge a statute on its face because it threatens third parties not before the
court.'3' This doctrine either: 1) protects those who want to engage in le-
gally protected expression but who may stop engaging in it because they
fear prosecution; or 2) protects those who refrain from engaging in it
rather than going through the hassle of having the law declared invalid. 32
b. Application of the Overbreadth Doctrine to the Instant Case
Article XXVIII is overbroad and violative of the United States Con-
128. See N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 268; see also Birdges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
270 (1941).
129. See id. at 268; see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
130. See id. at 268; see also United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y.) (1943).
131. Id.
132. See Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 572 (1987).
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stitution133 This argument is supported by the 1987 U.S. Supreme Court
case of Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v.
Jews for Jesus, Inc.134 In Board of Airport Commissioners, the Court held
that in public forums or public forums of government designation, First
Amendment protections are subject to heightened scrutiny. 35 The Court
went on to say:
For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end .... The State
may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner or
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample al-
ternative channels of communication. 136
The quote first addresses the government's ability to monitor the content
of speech and subsequently addresses the government's ability to monitor
the expression of that speech. AOE claimed that Yniguez's mode of
speaking while at work was being restricted, not the substance of her
message. Moreover, AOE claimed that it was within the power of the
government to monitor the manner of its employees' speech.137
In contrast, Yniguez asserts that Article XXVIII restricts socially val-
uable speech by government workers based on the content of the
speech. 38 Regardless of whether it is the content or mode of speech that
is being regulated in the case at bar, the reality is that the regulation of
Yniguez's speech was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest, such as efficiency and effectiveness of its workforce1 39 Simple
reason dictates that government offices are more efficient and effective
when employees can speak in languages other than English with consum-
ers of government services who cannot speak or read English very
well.14 Therefore Article XXVIII most likely fails under the above ar-
ticulated standard in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Board of Airport
Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.'4t
133. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995).
134. 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
135. Id. at 572.
136. Id.
137. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, No. 3 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT.
CAS., Nov. 18, 1996, at 138
138. Id.
139. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 942.
140. Id.
141. 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
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The regulation of speech required by Article XXVIII has not been
narrowly tailored because the language provision is broad and sweeping.
The Amendment plainly states that it applies to the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of both state and local government, and to all gov-
ernment officials and employees during the performance of government
business. 42 The rule also reads that all employees were required to act
only in English. 43 This broad language on its face means that it reaches
a "limitless variety of governmental settings."' 44 The Attorney General in
the Yniguez case tried to persuade the trial and appellate courts that the
plain meaning of the law was not to be read in such severe terms. 45 The
Attorney General wrote in Attorney General Opinion No. I 89-009
(1989) that Article XXVIH does not mean that languages other than En-
glish cannot be used when reasonable to facilitate the day-to-day opera-
tions of government.' The court of appeals, however, disagreed with the
Attorney General's reading. The Attorney General's reading is contra-
dicted by the provision's broad language as well as the fact that this
reading would render a sizeable portion of the Article superfluous. 47 If a
large portion of the Article is meaningless then this violates the rule of
statutory construction that a provision must be construed in such a way
that every word has some operative effect. 4
8
In order for a finding of overbreadth to be substantiated, there must
be numerous instances in which the provision will or would obstruct con-
stitutional rights. 49 For example, in New York State Club Assn. v. New
York City, the City of New York passed an act which required private
clubs to admit women and minority groups.'"' The City Council felt that
the public interest in equal opportunities outweighed the interest in pri-
vate association asserted by club members.' 5' The U.S. Supreme Court
stated that clubs for whom the antidiscrimination provisions would impair
their ability to associate together or advocate public or private viewpoints
were not named. 52 Nor.was the Court informed of the characteristics of
any particular clubs, and therefore it could not conclude that the law
142. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 932 (9th Cir. 1995).
143. Id. at 928.
144. Id. at 932.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 928.
147. Id. at 929.
148. SeeUnited States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992).
149. Id. See also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14
(1988).
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 6.
152. Id. at 14.
19981
138 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
threatened to undermine the associational or expressive purposes of any
club, let alone a substantial number of them. 53
In the Yniguez case, Article XXVIII violates a substantial number of
state employees' and officials' First Amendment rights. The amendment
prevented Ms. Yniguez, as well as many other bilingual employees and
state officials, from speaking Spanish with the Spanish-speaking consum-
ers of government services. 54 Furthermore, the interest of many
thousands of non-English speaking Arizonans in receiving vital informa-
•tion was severely limited. 55 Moreover, under Article XXVII, Arizona's
public schools and universities would be prohibited from issuing diplo-
mas in Latin, and judges performing weddings would be prohibited from
uttering "mazel tov" as part of the official wedding ceremony. 56 The
Amendment's broad language also applies to a limitless array of govern-
mental settings, from ministerial statements by civil servants at the office
to teachers speaking in the classroom, and from translation of judicial
proceedings in the courtroom to town-hall discussions between constitu-
ents and their representatives.1 7
The ramifications that Article XXVIII will have on elected officials,
like State Senator Gutierrez, is particularly alarming. 58 Freedom of
speech is the bedrock of our democratic heritage, and the language re-
strictions of Arizona's constitutional amendment strangulate the advocacy
of elected officials as well as their informative inquiry. The emasculation
of the power of open communication of ideas between elected officials
and their constituents threatens our republican society with extinction.
To illustrate, Article XXVIII obstructs the ability of candidates up
for re-election to speak with voters. 59 Only incumbents, not unelected
candidates, are burdened; this is because the amendment is applicable
only to elected officials.16 When one analyzes this scenario, it becomes
153. Id. As the Court stated, "No record was made in this respect, we are not in-
formed of the characteristics of any particular clubs, and hence we cannot conclude that
the Law threatens to undermine the associational or expressive purposes of any club, let
alone a substantial number of them." Id.
154. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F. 3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 1995).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 932.
157. Id. at 931.
158. Id. at 950. Article XXVIII, in prohibiting all government officials and employ-
ees during the performance of government business from speaking any language other
than English offends the First Amendment not only because it attempts to regulate ordi-
nary political speech, but also because it manipulates the political process by regulating
the speech of elected public servants.
159. Id. (Brunetti, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 950. (Brunetti, J., concurring ) "A candidate must be able to communi-
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evident that elected officials lose their First Amendment protection of
free speech merely by the fact that they are government officials. On the
other hand, nonincumbent candidates retain their constitutional rights by
the mere fact that they have not yet come to serve the government in an
official capacity. The illogic present in this scenario offends not only
common sense, it misconstrues the rights guaranteed every United States
citizen, regardless of their employment capacity.
A candidate must be able to communicate with voters in order for
voters to make an intelligent decision about whether to vote for a partic-
ular candidate. The First Amendment affords the most liberal protection
to such political expression in order to guarantee the interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes wished for by the
people. 61 Furthermore, there is a practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs, including the discussions of candidates. 62 This pro-
cess is thwarted, however, if politicians are prohibited from speaking
with constituents who may or may not be able to understand English.
Moreover, the Court has stated that legislators have a duty to take
positions on controversial political questions so that the public can be
completely informed by them to be better able to evaluate their qualifica-
tions for office, and so that the public may be represented in governmen-
tal debates by the person they have elected to represent them. 63 In fact,
discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates
are integral to the operation of the system of government created by the
Constitution. Embedded in the Constitution is this nation's commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open"164
cate with voters in order for voters to make an informed decision about whether to cast
their ballot for that candidate." Indeed the Supreme Court has said:
Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial political ques-
tions so that their constituents can be fully informed by them, and be better able
to assess their qualifications for office; also so they may be represented in gov-
ernmental debates by the person they have elected to represent them.
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1966). Communications between candidates and
voters is at the core of political action. The First Amendment prevents the disenfranchise-
ment that results when candidates for re-election are disabled from communicating with
any certain group.
161. Id.
162. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,115 S. Ct 1511 (1995); Winters v.
New York, 33 U.S. 507 (1948).
163. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 950 (9th Cir.
1995); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1966).
164. See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct at 1518.
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In the Yniguez case, political servants did not enjoy uninhibited de-
bate because they have been denied their right to communicate with their
constituencies in languages other than English. As a result, Arizona's law
burdens core political speech. When a law burdens core political speech,
it is examined under exacting scrutiny and can be upheld only if it is
narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest. 165 When entire
classes of United States citizens and their representatives are barred from
the political system through the execution of a state law, it is clear that
this law is not narrowly tailored and consequently is unconstitutional.
Moreover, Article XXVIII not only adversely affects voters' abilities
to assess candidates, it also interferes with officials' abilities to represent
their voters once they are elected.'6 Public servants cannot adequately
serve their constituents if they are prohibited from expressing their views
and learning the views of those constituents. 167 The First Amendment
prevents a successful electoral majority from restricting political commu-
nications with a certain segment of the electorate. 16
In addition to obstructing voting and political representation, Article
XXVIII attempts to redesign the political landscape.'6 It attempts to cre-
ate the appearance of a citizenry void of cultural ties and ethnic diversity.
Citizens are forced to give up one language for another one which is
more palatable to anti-immigrant coalitions. To impose political conform-
ity, by mandating that the same language be used for all political and
government dialogue, conflicts with the principles of liberty and freedom.
It snubs the crucial realization that language lies at the heart of ethnic di-
versity in our democratic and political process, and that both are inextri-
cably linked. 70
Consequently, the speech rights of all Arizonan state and local em-
ployees, officials and officers, as well as non-English speaking
Arizonans, are adversely affected by the enforcement of Article XXVIII.
The nature and structure of the amendment demonstrates that, as an inte-
grated whole, the provision seeks to proscribe the use of any words or
phrases in a language other than English in all oral and written commu-
nications by persons connected with the government.' 7' "There is no fair
reading of the amendment which would permit some of its language to
165. Id.
166. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 950.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 932.
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be divorced from this overriding objective."' 72
c. Affirmative versus Negative Rights
Ms. Yniguez did not seek an affirmative right to have government
operations conducted in foreign tongues. Instead, she sought to enforce a
negative right: that the state cannot, consistent with the First Amend-
ment, gag employees currently providing members of the public with in-
formation and thereby effectively prevent large numbers of individuals
from receiving information that they had earlier received. 73 Ms.
Yniguez's decision to provide services in Spanish does not conflict with
U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The Court has consistently held that it is
not a public right to receive information from the government in lan-
guages other than English. 74 In other words, non-English speaking peo-
ple have no affirmative right to force governments to provide information
in the language they can understand. In the instant case, Ms. Yniguez
was not requiring the government to offer services in Spanish. Instead,
she argued that if she was capable of offering the services in Spanish she
should not be precluded from doing so.
AOE argued that the First Amendment does not grant private citi-
zens a right to receive any particular information from the government in
any particular way.175 AOE's analysis is flawed from the beginning be-
cause Ms. Yniguez never once asserted that citizens are guaranteed the
right to receive government services in languages other than English (af-
firmative right). Instead, she simply argued that government employees
capable of providing a government service in a language other than En-
glish should be permitted to continue to do so (negative right). A person
should be allowed to continue the activity which he/she has in the past
been permitted to do. 76
Under a negative right theory, Ms. Yniguez argued that she should
not be prohibited from doing what the government has already permitted
her to do-deliver services in English and Spanish to consumers of gov-
ernment services. 177 So long as government is not harmed by Ms.
Yniguez's activity, the public's interest outweighs the government's inter-
est in not permitting the employee to do so. More importantly, in no way
172. Id.
173. Id. at 936.
174. Id.
175. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, No. 3 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT.
CAS., Nov. 18, 1996, at 138; see also International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992).
176. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 1995).
177. Id.
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does Ms. Yniguez equate a public employee's ability to communicate in
a foreign tongue with a mandatory duty to provide this service to non-
English speaking individuals. 78
d. Public Employee Speech
1.) General Principles
For nearly the last fifty years, it has been axiomatic that government
employees do not forfeit their First Amendment rights upon entering the
public workplace. 79 It has been settled that a state cannot condition pub-
lic employment on a basis that infringes upon the employee's constitu-
tionally protected interest in freedom of expression. °80 And a state consti-
tution cannot violate federally protected rights including the right of free
speech.' Although the government, whether federal, state, or local, has
been endowed with much power, this nation's forefathers never granted
the government the power to suffocate its citizens, no matter whether
they are government employees or not.
2. Regulating Traditional Types of Public Employee Speech
a.) Matters of Personal Concern
The government, as a general rule, must guarantee First Amendment
protection of public employees' speech. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme
Court has also held that there are limits to government employees'
speech when compared to the speech of ordinary private citizens.8 2 Con-
cemed that government offices could not function properly if every gov-
ernment employee was given unbridled power to speak out on matters of
personal concern during performance of their official duties, the court de-
cided to uphold certain speech restrictions. 83
Absent the most unusual circumstances, therefore, a challenged
speech restriction will be upheld if an employee speaks on a matter
solely of personal interest.8 4 Employee grievances and complaints about
internal working conditions affecting only the speaker and co-workers
178. Id.
179. Id. at 937.
180. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983).
181. See DANIEL FARBER Er AL.. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 168 (1993); see also State v.
Russel, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
182. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 938 (9th Cir. 1995).
183. Id. at 939.
184. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
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should rarely be protected by federal courts. 8 5 In addition, the ban on
employee speech is extended to include prohibiting employees from us-
ing rude or vulgar language in the workplace.8 6
In the Yniguez case, Ms. Yniguez's speech was neither rude nor vul-.
gar, nor was it confined to conditions affecting only Ms. Yniguez or her
co-workers. Ms. Yniguez's speech was not a matter of personal concern
at all. Her speech focused on matters of public concern, and this does not
fit the exception in which the government may limit employees' speech
on matters of personal concern. Accordingly, Arizona's ban implicated
the rights of the Arizonan public. By barring Ms. Yniguez and public
employees from using languages other than English during their official
activities, many non-English speaking citizens stand to lose valuable in-
formation and services. 8 7
Ms. Yniguez's speech was not disruptive, rather it was the antithesis
of disruptive; it facilitated the delivery of government services to its em-
ployees. The Ninth Circuit in its en banc decision even stated that
Yniguez's ability to speak Spanish was analogous to speech on matters
of public importance because she was providing a valuable service to the
public.'18 Accordingly, Ms. Yniguez's use of Spanish on the job must be
accorded full First Amendment protection. 8 9
b.) Matters of Public Concern
As stated above, Ms. Yniguez's speech was not a matter of personal
concern. Instead, it falls within the category of matters of public concern.
As a general rule, government employees, when speaking on matters of
public concern, are guaranteed First Amendment protection. 90 Even
though Ms. Yniguez and other government employees work for the gov-
ernment, they have not relinquished "the First Amendment rights they
would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public inter-
est."' 191 When a court is required to determine the validity of the govern-
ment's restraint on job-related speech of public employees, it uses the
Pickering balancing test.192
185. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 939.
186. See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1886 (1994) (plurality).
187. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 940.
188. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, No. 3 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT.
CAS., Nov. 18, 1996, at 138; Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920,
942-43 (9th Cir. 1995).
189. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
190. Connick v. Myer, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
191. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1012.
192. Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High School Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568
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The Pickering test requires that the government's concern with the
efficiency and effectiveness of public services be balanced against the in-
terest of the public employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern. 193 To illustrate, private speech involving little more
than a complaint about a change in the employee's duties is not constitu-
tionally protected as a matter of public concern because it focuses on an
individual not the group. 94 However, if the speech does pertain to a mat-
ter of public concern, the government bears the burden of justifying the
adverse employment action. 95
c.) Pickering Test
In applying the Pickering test, it is necessary to determine the inter-
ests of the employee, as a citizen, speaking upon matters of public con-
cern. 96 The speech banned by Article XXVIII is undoubtedly of public
concern. It is related to the delivery of government services and informa-
tion. Unless the speech is delivered in a form that the intended recipients
can understand, they are likely to be cheated of greatly needed data as
well as significant private and public benefits.'9 The heart of the instant
debate concerns speech that members of the public have an interest in
hearing. In addition, more often than not it is the public, not the public
employee, who initiates dialogue in languages other than English. 98 If
the premise is accepted that speech is of public concern if the public
wants to hear it,'99 it logically follows when non-English speaking people
communicate to public employees in a language other than English, they
then would like the content of the government's message to be in the for-
eign language they understand. This correlates with the Yniguez case be-
(1968). The Pickering balancing test arose from a 1968 Supreme Court case involving a
teacher who wrote and published a letter in the newspaper criticizing the Board of Educa-
tion's allocation of school funds between educational and athletic programs, and the
Board's and superintendent's methods of preventing the school district's taxpayers from
learning why additional tax revenues were being sought for schools.
193. Id. at 568.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. U.S. v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465-66 (1995). This
is one side of the balancing equation.
197. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official 1 English, 69 F.3d 920, 940 (9th Cir. 1995).
Again, Yniguez does not argue citizens are guaranteed delivery of services in a form of
speech that the recipients can receive, but, if it is available, the employee should not be
precluded from giving it.
198. See id.; see also Connick v. Myer, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
199. See Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 940; Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998-99 (4th Cir.
1985).
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cause Ms. Yniguez had a significant number of claimants who spoke to
her in Spanish and who best understood Spanish. °°
The practical effects of Article XXVIII's de facto bar on communi-
cations by or with government employees are numerous. For example,
monolingual Spanish-speaking residents of Arizona cannot communicate
effectively with employees of a state or housing office about a landlord's
wrongful retention of a rental deposit, nor can they learn from clerks of
the state court where and how to file court complaints.20' Moreover, they
are helpless in gathering information about state or local social services,
or adequately informing government agencies that their employees are
not doing their jobs properly, or that the government itself is running in-
efficiently or dishonestly.m Those handicapped by a limited command of
English will face commensurate difficulties in obtaining or providing
such information.2
Furthermore, as previously discussed, Article XXVIII greatly re-
stricts the ability of state officials and legislators to communicate with
the electorate concerning official matters. The amendment prohibits a leg-
islative committee from gathering on a reservation and questioning a tri-
bal leader in his native language in the hope of trying to learn what the
problems of his community might be.2o4 A state delegate of Navajo an-
cestry, as well as her staff, would be prevented from discovering directly
from her Navajo-speaking constituents about dilemmas they desired to
bring to her attention."5 Ultimately, the legislative fact-finding function
would be directly affected. 2°6
Because the amendment to Arizona's Constitution significantly re-
stricts if not completely bars communications by and with government
employees and officials, it ultimately injures the ability of non-English
speaking citizens to "receive information and ideas. ' ' 207 As the Court
stated in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,2°m the freedom of speech "necessarily protects the right to
receive."20°9 Thus, a state may not suppress dissemination of concededly
200. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 940-42.
201. Id. at 940.
202. Id.
203. Id. See also Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
204. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 940.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
209. Id. at 756 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972)).
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truthful information about an entirely lawful activity.210 The dissemination
of ideas can achieve nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free
to receive and consider those ideas. 21' It would be a barren marketplace
of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.212
In addition, the fact that Article XXVIII straight-jackets government
employees' speech will ultimately manifest itself by inhibiting the pub-
lic's right to read and hear what the employees would have otherwise
written or said.213 There is no way to calculate the price of that burden,
but it cannot be ignored. The Court wrote in Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy that freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker.214 In Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy, the willing speaker was a licensed pharmacist
who violated Section 54-524.-35 of the Virginia Annotated Code (1994)
when he advertised the price of prescription drugs.215 In the Yniguez case,
the willing speaker was a bilingual employee who of her own free will
responded to questions posed to her by non-English speaking constituents
about their medical claims. Where a speaker exists, as in the case at bar
and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, "protection afforded is to the com-
munication, to its source and to its recipients both. '216
Even if one were not to agree with the majority in Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy, the above speech would still be protected under the
threshold test of the dissent. The dissent endorsed the principle that there
is a right to receive information when there is no other way to .obtain the
sought after data.217 In the Yniguez case, there was no other way for the
public to gain the information needed from the government other than to
speak with its employees. Despite the fact that Yniguez voluntarily of-
fered her services in a language other than English, her speech still di-
rectly impacted the public. By speaking Spanish, Ms. Yniguez was able
to facilitate the process through which some Arizona citizens filed medi-
cal claims.
Article XXVIII obstructs the free flow of information and adversely
affects the rights of many private individuals. "[T]he right to receive
ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of
210. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
211. See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965).
212. See Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free School District No.26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 867 (1982); see also Lamont v. Post Master General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965).
213. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 749-50.
216. Id. at 756.
217. Id. at 757.
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her own rights of speech, press, and political freedom. 218
A Popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And
a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm them-
selves with the power which knowledge gives. 219
It is counterintuitive to suggest that Arizona is better off because ob-
stacles are put in the way of its citizens, and consequently they are hin-
dered from collecting those services owed them as taxpayers. Moreover,
there is no utility in an amendment which gags the communication be-
tween government officials and citizens, and which necessarily
culminates in the prevention of citizens gaining access to their state
government.
d.) Government's Purported Interest in Efficiency
Despite the countless ways in which Article XXVIII interferes with
the rights of state employees and the public, Arizona argues that its at-
tempt to foster government efficiency outweighs the gagging of employee
speech, and that the government will be more efficient if all its employ-
ees perform their official duties in English. Arizona buttressed its argu-
ment with the fact that Yniguez's supervisor did not speak Spanish and
allegedly could not monitor her statements when she spoke in Spanish. 22
The facts of the case, however, contradict the assertion that effi-
ciency of the state government will be impeded if Yniguez speaks in a
language other than English.221 First, Yniguez facilitated government effi-
ciency when she communicated in a language other than English with re-
cipients of government services who are not proficient in English. 222 In
fact, it makes little or no sense for Ms. Yniguez or any state employee to
spend an immeasurable amount of time conveying to non-English speak-
ers what it is that they must do in order for the government to deliver its
services, particularly when it can be accomplished in much less time if
the employee simply speaks in a foreign tongue.
218. Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
219. Id. (quoting 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed., 1910)).
220. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, No. 3 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT.
CAS., Nov. 18, 1996, at 138.
221. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 942 (9th Cir. 1995).
222. Id.
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e.) How the Balance lIps after Applying the Pickering Balance Test
In light of Ms. Yniguez's interest in speech as a matter of public
concern and the State's interest in efficiency, the balance ultimately tips
in favor of protecting the speech rights of state officers and employees.
The court would not say that the interests of the employee, as a citizen,
in commenting upon matters of public concern, is outweighed by the
State, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees. This conclusion is supported by com-
mon sense, the Constitution, and the case law.223 The Yniguez case
closely resembles United States v. National Treasury Employees Union.?4
In National Treasury Employees Union, employees of the executive
branch brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the Ethics in
Government Act prohibiting the receipt of honoraria by government em-
ployees.225 The Court wrote that even though the respondents work for
the government, they had not relinquished the First Amendment rights
they otherwise possessed as citizens to comment on public matters. 226
And if the speech involves a matter of public concern, the government
bears the burden of justifying its adverse employment action.2 The gov-
ernment must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a
large group of present and future employees in a broad range of present
and future expression are outweighed by that expression's necessary im-
pact on government's actual operation.m
The statute in question in National Treasury Employees Union had
serious unconstitutional implications. Although it did not prohibit any
speech, the ban did impose a serious burden on expressive activity.? 9 By
denying federal employees (including lawyers, union officials, civil ser-
vants, and the like) compensation for their time, the ban would more
likely than not begin to curtail their speeches and formal publications.2"
The Yniguez case essentially mirrors National Treasury Employees Union,
but is more serious because the ban in question is broader and ultimately
prohibits speech not merely discourages it.
223. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995);
see also Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
224. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 466.
228. Id. at 468.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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In National Treasury Employees Union, as well as in Yniguez, the
statutes will inevitably diminish the expressive output of non-policy-
making employees. The massive disincentive of government employees'
expression also places a significant burden on the public's right to read
and hear what the employees would have otherwise communicated. 23
Deferring to the government's speculation about the harmful effects of
thousands of communications yet to be written or delivered would in-
trude unacceptably on the First Amendment's protections.23 2 As Justice
Brandeis reminded the bench, a " 'reasonable' burden on expression re-
quires a justification far stronger than mere speculation about serious
harms. "233
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women ....
To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced.3 4
Consequently, the government failed to persuade the Court that the
ban was a reasonable response to possible harms. "Although operational
efficiency is undoubtedly a vital governmental interest," 23 5 several fea-
tures of the bans "cast serious doubt on the Government's submission
that Congress thought of honoraria as so threatening to the efficiency of
the entire federal service as to render the ban a reasonable response to
the threat."' '  Likewise, the sweeping egregious ramifications of Article
XXVIII cast doubt on Arizona's argument that it thought state employees
and officials communicating to the public in a language other than En-
glish during official business was so threatening to the efficiency of the
entire state service as to render the ban a reasonable response to the
threat.237
The foregoing discussions show that Ms. Yniguez's interest, as well
as future plaintiffs' interests, in speech as a matter of public concern out-
weighs the State's interest in efficiency. In light of previously discussed
case law and federal constitutional principles, Article XXVII should be
231. Id. at 470.
232. Id. at 475.
233. Id.
234. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)).
235. Id. at 1016.
236. Id. at 1016; see also Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888-89 (1994).
237. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 944 (9th Cir.
1995).
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overturned as unconstitutional. However, since the Supreme Court de-
clined to rule on the merits of the case, the country must guess at
whether Article XXVIII and similar English-only rules are
unconstitutional.
Part III discusses generally the future of English-only statutes as
they relate to recent case law addressing exclusivist legislation-legisla-
tion which singles out and prevents a specified class of people from
seeking the basic protections offered by the government. The Comment
then proceeds to discuss Ruiz v. Symington, a Ninth Circuit case which
most likely will be appealed to the Supreme Court.
I. THE FATE OF "ENGLISH-ONLY" STATURES
A. General Indications of the Supreme Court's
Stance on Exclusivist Legislation
The Supreme Court throughout its history has consistently struck
down legislation that precludes an isolated group of people from en-
joying the safeguards of government.238 Recently, the Court, again, de-
clared exclusivist legislation unconstitutional. 239 The Court in Romer v.
Evans240 made it clear that it did not support legislation favoring homo-
geneity in American society when it held "unconstitutional a Colorado
state initiative prohibiting Colorado municipalities from enacting antidis-
crimination laws protecting bisexual and homosexual residents.' 241
Romer is closely related to Yniguez because both deal with a similar
substantive issue: legislation which is exclusivist and hostile to outsider
groups. The Romer Court stated that one century ago, Justice Harland ad-
monished the Court that the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. ' 242 Therefore, the Court held that the amendment
238. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, No. 3 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT.
CAS., Nov. 18, 1996, at 139. See also Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996).
The amendment reads:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby ho-
mosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination.
242. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
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to Colorado's Constitution unallowably singled out and precluded a spec-
ified class of people from seeking the basic protections offered by local
governments.243 Bilingual Arizona state employees and officials as well
as non-English speaking residents, much like Colorado gays and bisexu-
als, have confronted a similar hostile and exclusivist movement. Those
non-English or outsider groups have been singled out and receive inade-
quate constitutional protections when compared to their English-speaking
counterparts.244
Amendment Two of Colorado's Constitution put homosexuals in a
solitary class in both the private and governmental spheres. 245 The
amendment withdrew from homosexuals, much like Arizona's Article
XXVmI withdraws from bilinguals and non-English speaking residents
but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by dis-
crimination. 2" The amendment imposed a special disability upon gays
and bilinguals alone. They were forbidden the safeguards that others en-
joy or may seek without constraint.247
Both amendments fail the rational basis test of the 1993 Supreme
Court case of Heller v. Doe.2" Heller is important here because this case
focused on laws burdening fundamental rights and legislation targeted at
a suspect class.249 According to the Court in Heller, if a law neither bur-
dens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the legislative classi-
fication will be upheld so long as it bears a rational relation to some le-
gitimate end.3 In Yniguez and Romer, the legislation at issue fails even
this conventional inquiry for two reasons. First, the amendments have the
peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a
single named group.251 Second, their breadth is so "discontinuous with
the reasons offered for [them] that the amendment[s] seem inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class that [they] affect[]; [they] lack[]
a rational relationship to legitimate state interests. ' ' 252 Article XXVII and
Amendment Two identify persons by a single trait and then deny them
protection across the board; it is not within the country's constitutional
243. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, No. 3 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. Cl'.
CAS., Nov. 18, 1996, at 139.
244. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625-26.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1626.
248. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996). See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 312-13, (1993).
249. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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tradition to enact laws of this sort.3 "Central both to the idea of the rule
of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the
principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial
terms to all who seek its assistance. ' '12 4
A second and related point is that the laws of the kind now before
us create the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed rises
from animosity toward the class of persons affected.2"1 "If the constitu-
tional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest, ' '2" 6
no matter whether the group we are speaking of are homosexuals or non-
English speaking United States residents. Even laws enacted for broad
and ambitious purposes can easily be explained by reference to legitimate
public policies which justify the incidental harms they impose on certain
individuals. 257 Amendment Two and Article XXVII, however, in making
the announcement that gays and lesbians as well as bilinguals and non-
English speaking residents shall not have any particular protections from
the law, inflict on them "immediate, continuing, and real injuries that
outrun or belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for
[them]."258
The above analysis leads to the inevitable conclusion that the U.S.
Supreme Court will declare unconstitutional Article XXVI as it unfairly
discriminates against isolated sects of the population. The Romer case
provides the courts an additional reason to defeat the amendment. The
courts now have three viable bases to declare unconstitutional the En-
glish-only law: original intent of the forefathers, First Amendment case
law, and Equal Protection case law. While the Yniguez case deprived the
country of an opportunity to settle the fate of English-only rules, the na-
tion will not have to wait much longer. The future of English-only laws
may possibly be decided with the Ruiz case. The final portion of this
Comment will address what may become this country's most ground-
breaking case in terms of employee speech.
253. Id. at 1627-28.
254. Id. at 1628.
255. Id. at 1627-28.
256. Id. a; 1628.
257. Id.
258. Id.
[Vol. 22
YNIGUEZ V. ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH
B. The Future of Ruiz v. Symington Depends
on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII
The true interpretation of Article XXVII and the constitutionality of
the constitutional amendment may ultimately be addressed in Ruiz v. Sy-
mington.25 9 If Ruiz is not the case which settles this volatile issue, one
need not fear. English-only statutes are being passed at a phenomenal
rate.m Undoubtedly, this issue will not go away and is bound to come
before the U.S. Supreme Court. The decision of the Arizona Supreme
Court in Ruiz, and if appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the
Court's final decision, will bring with it a tidal wave of ramifications.
Nation-wide state initiatives and similar proposals before Congress will
undergo microscopic examination. The likely result is that federal and
state legislation, similar to that of Arizona's Article XXVIII, will become
unconstitutional and unenforceable.
The Arizona Supreme Court has the heavy burden of determining
the true meaning of Article XXVIII. The Court has two options: 1) it can
adopt the State Attorney General's interpretation of the constitutional
amendment; or 2) it can reject this post-hoc legal strategy and instead
agree with Supreme Court precedent. The court is likely to pick option
two since it is consistent with First Amendment case law and jurispru-
dential precedent regarding exclusivist legislation.
In his last ditch effort to lessen the severity of interpretation of Arti-
cle XXVIII, the Attorney General of Arizona issued a post-hoc opin-
ion. 26' The Attorney General proffered that Article XXVIII should be
read as a whole in line with other portions of the Arizona Constitution,
with the United States Constitution, and federal laws.262 While Article
XXVIII compels the performance of official acts of the government in
English, the Attorney General argued that government employees re-
mained free to use other languages to foster the delivery of government
services.263
Construction of the word "act" as used in the amendment to mean
more than an "official act of government" would raise questions of com-
patibility with state and federal guarantees and civil rights legislation.264
In addition, in addressing the handling of customer inquiries or com-
259. 1996 WL 309512 (Ariz. App., June 11, 1996).
260. See generally Schmid, supra note 3.
261. Op. Att'y Gen. Ariz. No. I 89-009 (1989).
262. See Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 1997 WL 84990, at *5.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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plaints involving state or local government services, the Attorney General
stated:
All official documents that are governmental acts must be in En-
glish, but translation services and accommodating communica-
tions are permissible, and may be required if reasonably neces-
sary to the fair and effective delivery of services, or required by
specific federal regulation. Communications between elected and
other governmental employees with the public at large may be in
a language other than English on these same principles. 265
Public employees and elected officials, on the contrary, argue that
the State Attorney General's interpretation of Article XXVIII conflicts
not only with the plain meaning of the constitutional amendment, but
also with the words and actions of Governor Mofford of Arizona. 266 Arti-
cle XXVIII reads that the " 'State and all [of its] political subdivi-
sions'- defined as including 'all government officials and employees
during the performance of government business'- 'shall act in English
and no other language.' 267 Even a cursory reading of Article XXVIII
demonstrates that the provision as an integrated whole seeks to achieve
one specific goal: "to prohibit the use in all oral and written communica-
tions by persons connected with the government of all words and phrases
in any language other than English." 2 The court of appeals sitting en
banc in Yniguez stated that there is no just reading of the Article that
would permit some of its language to be divorced from this overriding
objective. 269
The Attorney General's argument that the amendment provided free-
dom for state employees to deliver services in languages other than En-
glish is clearly disingenuous. If the true intention of AOE had been to
maintain the integrity of the use of foreign languages during the govern-
ment acts, the amendment would not have been written in such sweeping
generalities. Furthermore, if in fact employees are permitted to speak in
foreign tongues during official government business, as the Attorney
General and Governor Mofford contended, then the amendment fails to
accomplish its goal of having government officials and employees act in
English and no other language during the performance of government
business. There would be no purpose in having a constitutional referen-
265. Id.
266. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 928-30 (9th Cir. 1995).
267. Yniguez v. Arizonans For Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1995).
268. Id. at 1229.
269. Id.
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dum to amend the Arizona Constitution if the provision was unenforced
and rendered mere surplusage. Moreover, Governor Mofford threatened
to enforce Article XXVIII against state employees.270 In particular, the
courts relied on the fact that Mofford officially announced that she in-
tended to comply with Article XXVIII and expected state service em-
ployees to obey the amendment.27 1
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court, as guarantor and gate keeper of the Constitution, has the
responsibility of ensuring that every citizen's constitutional liberties are
respected. As such, the Court needs no reminder of the huge burden it
bares in ending the draconian results which Article XXVII and similar
initiatives require- major portions of this country's populace are gagged
and ostracized.
While free speech lost the battle in Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official
English, it inevitably will win the war. Free speech lost out because the
Court refused to hear the merits of Yniguez. When the Court refused to
entertain the substantive issue of the constitutionality of English-only
laws in the public sector, governments around the country were given the
chance to continue fostering and enforcing such laws. Although this case
has "officially" gone away, it is gone in name only. The substantive is-
sues of this case remain.
In light of the fact that a plethora of English-only laws exist and
continue to be proposed on the state and federal level, the Court is bound
to tackle this tiger. The Court may have the opportunity to resolve this
issue sooner rather than later because Ruiz v. Symington may arrive
shortly at the Court's door. Without doubt, this issue will hit the Court
again even if Ruiz fails to make it to the Court, and when it does, free
speech will win the war. Free speech will win the war because sufficient
judicial precedent grounded in First Amendment and Equal Protection
principles exists to defeat English-only laws in the public sector.
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